Experience with OSPP Evaluations

Gerald Krummeck, atsec information security

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Agenda

- A short OSPP history

- Evaluations using OSPP

- Experience and Pitfalls

- Lessons Learned for OSPP's future

How It Started

A short history of OSPP

Development suggested at the ICCC in Rome (2007)

- CAPP and LSPP functionality no longer address core functions of modern operating systems

- Suggestion was to develop a "base PP" and "extended packages"

  - Extended packages contain not only SFRs but also a "security problem definition" part defining what threats and objectives are addressed by the package

- Suggested to develop a framework how extended packages can be combined with the base PP

Scope

A short history of OSPP

- PP for general-purpose operating systems

- Modern operating systems, realistic environments

- Servers and well-managed workstations

- Baseline: agreed functionality set among developers

- Provide more than a baseline
  -> extended packages for additional functionality

# The BSI OSPP

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- Development started August 2008
- Input/Feedback from OS experts
  - „Technical community" was not invented yet…
- Evaluated /certified in 2010 with extended packages:
  - Advanced Management
  - Advanced Audit
  - General Purpose Cryptography
  - Extended Identification and Authentication
  - Integrity Verification
  - Labeled Security
  - Trusted Boot
  - Virtualization

Evaluations with OSPP

	BASE	Advanced Audit	Advanced Management	Cryptography	Extended I&A	Integrity Verification	Labeled Security	Trusted Boot	Virtualization
AIX V7.1	■		■	■		■	■		■
RHEL v6.1	■	■				■	■		
SLES 11	■								■
z/OS V1R11 - 13	■				■		■		
z/VM V5.1	■						■		■

Lessons Learned (1)

It's the little differences …

- Operating systems are **very** different ,
  as are vendors, markets and customers
  - Vendors address different markets and want to distinguish themselves (extended packages, additional SFRs)
  - need for flexibility without settling for the least common denominator only
  - government requirements don't fit everybody
    (in fact, they don't fit most customers)

- Assurance
  - EAL4 accepted and established in the market

Pits to Fall Into

Cryptography, an enigma of its own...

- Hardware support (IBM zSeries, Intel, ...)
  - Crypto functions performed outside of the TOE
  - OS Developers do no control HW implementation
  - No EAL4-level analysis possible
- Fallback to SW implementation not acceptable to customers
- Need to accept crypto outside of TOE
- Solution: Require communication protocols (IPSec, TLS, SSH) without specific SFRs on crypto (FTP_ITC, no FCS)
- Composition needs to be addressed for SW products
- RNGs: already worded for scheme-specific solutions

More Pitfalls

Your management is my access control

- Right to manage a certain function implemented by access rights to configuration file
- One security function implemented by another
- Management detached from security function (same for audit)
- Possible solution:
  - SFRs for security functions describe their management, too
  - FMT SFRs for global management aspects only

Dealing with Complexity

Having a meaningful TSS

- Squeezing all functional detail into SFRs does not help
  - Comparing SFRs will be impossible
  - Sometimes hard to clearly describe within prescribed SFR wording
- Possible Solutions
  - Use extended SFRs (issue: consistency between PPs)
  - Describe implementation more detailed in TSS
  - Example z/OS: Unique tag for testable statements
    - Anchor for mapping for testing, design doc, guidance, etc.

My Lessons Learned for OSPP Harmonization Effort

Disclaimer: My Lessons only ☺

- Base and extended packages are useful concepts
- Discussion in Technical Community will be critical success factor
- Be careful not to specify implementation details in PPs
  - Even if you know Windows and Linux, that's not the whole story yet
- What's easy in a specific case may be hard to generalize
  - „I know it when I see it" (Justice Potter Stewart, 1964)
- Document evaluation work and rationale for verdicts in enough detail to allow judgment by third party
- More guidance on specific evaluation tasks would be helpful
  - Don't expect enough detail to program your evaluation robot
- Even if you don't like it: Nothing beats experience